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Maryland’s	electoral	maps	show	how	proportional
representation	could	solve	the	problem	of
gerrymandering
This	week	the	US	Supreme	Court	hears	a	case	concerning	the
constitutionality	of	partisan	gerrymandering	in	Maryland.
Examining	current,	past,	and	alternative	electoral	maps,	Alex
Keena,	Michael	Latner,	Anthony	J.	McGann,	and	Charles
Anthony	Smith	find	that	by	making	districts	more	competitive,
some	redistricting	plans	can	actually	work	against	one	party	or
the	other.	Only	the	introduction	of	proportional	representation	with	multi-member	districts,	they	argue,	would	mean	a
truly	fair	electoral	system	for	Maryland.	
On	March	28,	the	US	Supreme	Court	will	hear	its	second	case	this	session	concerning	the	constitutionality	of
partisan	gerrymandering,	and	the	capacity	of	scientific	standards	to	detect	violations	of	constitutional	rights.		Voters
in	Maryland’s	6th	Congressional	district	claim	that,	as	a	result	of	the	2011	redistricting	plan	designed	by	the	state
legislature’s	Democratic	majority	and	then-Democratic	governor,	their	once	reliably	GOP	district	was	geographically
transformed	into	a	Democratic	seat.
The	nature	of	Maryland’s	gerrymander	is	distinct	because	of	the	way	that	Republicans	have	to	be	distributed	in	order
for	Democrats	to	gain	partisan	advantage.		It	is	a	great	example	for	demonstrating	the	different	ways	that	deviations
between	vote	and	seat	shares	can	be	created.
The	current	Maryland	plan,	pictured	below	in	a	map	designed	by	Stephen	Wolf	at	Daily	Kos,	is	clearly	a	Democratic
gerrymander,	as	a	variety	of	statistical	estimates	(bias	at	50	percent,	efficiency	gap,	mean-median	gap,	etc.)	have
demonstrated	that	Republicans	asymmetrically	waste	more	votes	in	the	conversion	of	votes	to	seats.
Figure	1
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In	a	Democratic-leaning	state	with	eight	Congressional	seats,	what	was	a	25	percent	seat	share	for	Republicans	in
2010	was	reduced	to	a	13	percent	seat	share,	a	single	seat,	in	2012,	even	though	the	GOP	typically	earns	around
one	third	of	the	statewide	vote.		It	is	seemingly	ironic	then,	by	at	least	one	measure	of	asymmetry,	partisan	bias	at	50
percent	share,	the	previous	plan	was	actually	more	asymmetric.		Indeed,	the	pattern	of	discrimination	that	emerges
shows	that	Democrats	gained	their	“extra”	seat,	not	by	packing	more	Republicans	into	the	GOP-held	1st	district,	but
by	making	districts	more	competitive	overall.		Alternate	map	simulations	show	how	this	is	possible.
By	distinguishing	the	different	ways	that	statewide	vote	shares	are	distorted	into	inefficient	seat	shares	for	a	party,	it
is	easy	to	see	how	a	more	competitive	map	can	actually	produce	a	more	distorted	outcome.		Consider	that	the	only
conversion	of	votes	to	seats	that	treats	each	voter	perfectly	equally	is	exact	proportional	representation	(PR),	that	is,
when	the	percentage	of	votes	for	a	party	yields	the	exact	same	percentage	of	seats.		Any	deviation	from	perfect	PR
yields	“disproportionality”	(which	is	measured	here	using	the	Gallagher	Index).		There	are	various	reasons	why	all	of
the	world’s	electoral	systems	generate	some	disproportionality,	but	our	Congressional	elections	generate	two
powerful	and	distinct	varieties.
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One	way	is	through	partisan	bias	(the	first	column	of	Table	1),	meaning	where	two	parties	receive	50	percent	of	a
statewide	vote,	but	the	gerrymandering	party	receives	a	bonus	seat	share.		If	there	is	insignificant	bias,	voters	in	both
parties	are	treated	equally.		This	specific	form	of	bias	is	measured	using	an	estimation	technique	developed	by	Gary
King	and	Andrew	Gelman,	and	it	has	the	advantage	of	separating	out	another	way	that	single-seat,	winner-take-all
elections	generate	disproportionality,	through	the	“responsiveness”	of	the	system,	which	reflects	how	much	of	a	seat
bonus	a	winning	party	gets	for	every	percentage	point	in	vote	share	that	it	gains.
Table	1	–	Bias,	Responsiveness	and	Disproportionality	in	Past,	Current	and	Alternate	MD
Plans
In	addition	to	the	pre-2012	and	current	plans,	we	need	to	look	at	three	alternate	plans	based	on	the	same	electoral
data,	average	Congressional	and	2012	Presidential	vote	returns.		The	first	alternate	maximizes	Democratic	Party
advantage	even	beyond	the	current	plan,	illustrating	how	key	responsiveness	is	for	Democrats.		Next,	a	hypothetical
fair	plan	shows	that	it	is	possible	to	reduce	both	bias	and	responsiveness	simultaneously,	but	that	disproportionality
against	the	minority	party	is	inevitable.		That	is,	unless	an	alternate,	proportional	(PR)	electoral	system	is	used	to
account	for	minority	vote	shares	within	districts,	as	shown	with	the	last	alternate	plan.
Voting	outcomes	change	dramatically	from	the	districting	plan	that	was	used	from	2002-2010	(data	are	averages
from	those	elections)	and	the	current	plan,	used	since	2012.		Overall	disproportionality	between	the	two	plans	has
more	than	doubled	from	11.2	to	24.5.		But	notice	that	bias,	which	is	positive	when	favoring	Democrats	and	negative
when	favoring	Republicans,	is	actually	reduced.		If	Republicans	made	up	a	majority	of	the	electorate,	as	they	did
when	they	elected	Governor	Larry	Hogan	in	2015,	their	Congressional	candidates	would	actually	do	better	under	the
current	plan,	though	with	50	percent	of	the	vote	they	still	receive	14	percent	fewer	seats	on	average	compared	to
Democrats.
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The	increased	responsiveness,	which	roughly	doubles	to	3.9	percent,	greatly	advantages	the	majority	Democrats	by
amplifying	the	magnitude	of	bias.		The	biggest	geographic	advantage	was	gained	where	Democrats	changed	the	6th
district	boundaries	to	include	more	voters	from	metropolitan	Washington	D.C.		This	shifted	the	6th	from	a	GOP-
leaning	to	a	Democratic-leaning	district,	but	it	also	made	the	adjacent	8th	and	other	districts	more	competitive,	if	still
safely	Democratic.		The	current	plan	is	more	of	a	“dispersal”	gerrymander	than	a	“packing”	gerrymander.		Under	the
old	plan,	Republicans	were	packed	into	two	“sink”	districts	where	they	had	two	seats,	but	even	with	a	massive	wave
in	Republican	support,	they	would	not	gain	any	more	seats.		Today,	Republicans	in	Northwest	Maryland	are	more
efficiently	distributed,	but	the	responsiveness	of	the	system	works	against	them.
Because	one	party	always	wins	100	percent	of	seats	in	single-seat	districts,	the	“perfect”	plan	for	a	majority	party	is
to	make	every	district	a	microcosm	of	the	state,	yielding	it	100	percent	of	the	seats.		Stephen	Wolf	shows	how	this
strategy	is	actually	possible	in	Maryland,	where	there	is	a	surplus	of	Democratic	voters	to	distribute,	and	they	could
actually	capture	all	eight	Democratic	seats,	using	a	Chicago-style	pizzamander	to	slice	up	metropolitan	D.C.	and
Baltimore.
Figure	2
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In	this	scenario,	bias	virtually	disappears.		This	is	an	unbiased	plan,	in	the	sense	that	either	party	earning	over	60
percent	of	the	vote	(the	Democratic	average)	could	capture	all	eight	seats.		Dispersal	plans	maximize	the	principle	of
“winner-take-all”	by	maximizing	responsiveness,	yielding	a	disproportionate	seat	bonus	to	whichever	party	wins	the
most	votes.		That	is	to	say,	disproportionality	generated	by	responsiveness	is	a	feature,	not	a	bug,	of	our	single-seat
system,	though	it	can	be	minimized	by	drawing	safe	seats	for	both	parties	(an	incumbent	protection	plan).
Whatever	the	constitutional	justification,	the	current	gerrymander	is	justiciable,	and	the	remedy	is	fairly
straightforward.		We	were	able	to	generate	a	plan	using	the	same	electoral	data	from	the	previous	maps,	with	no
significant	bias,	and	responsiveness	comparable	to	pre-2012	levels.		Republicans	would	have	a	safe	seat	in	the	6th,
and	there	are	two	competitive	seats	in	the	1st	and	2nd,	one	Democratic-leaning,	the	other	GOP-leaning.		This	plan
also	includes	two	African-American	majority	districts,	and	is	much	more	respectful	of	county	boundaries.
Figure	3
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This	is	about	as	fair	a	plan	as	Republicans	can	expect,	without	moving	to	a	more	proportional	districting	system	that
would	minimize	the	impact	of	being	the	minority	party	in	most	districts.		Multi-seat	districts	are	currently	prohibited	for
Congress,	but	there	is	a	bill	in	committee,	the	Fair	Representation	Act,	that	would	facilitate	multi-seat	Congressional
districts.		Several	states	previously	elected	their	Congressional	delegates	using	multi-seat	districts,	though	they	used
discriminatory	plurality	formulas.		Several	state	legislatures,	including	Maryland,	still	use	multi-seat	districts	to	elect
some	members.
The	last	alternate,	PR	plan,	divides	Maryland	into	two	districts,	with	district	one	containing	five	seats,	and	district	two
containing	the	other	three	seats.		The	larger	district	includes	the	more	heavily	populated	region	of	the	state.
Figure	4
USApp – American Politics and Policy Blog: Maryland’s electoral maps show how proportional representation could solve the problem of gerrymandering Page 6 of 8
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-03-27
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2018/03/27/marylands-electoral-maps-show-how-proportional-representation-could-solve-the-problem-of-gerrymandering/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/
Using	a	neutral	electoral	formula	for	seat	allocation	(one	that	does	not	provide	a	bonus	to	the	largest	party),	this
system	would	assure	two	seats	to	Republicans	(assuming	two	party	competition),	and	would	nearly	assure	them	a
third	seat	in	the	larger	district,	for	a	total	of	38	percent	of	the	seats,	about	as	proportional	as	you	can	get
(responsiveness	is	trickier	to	estimate	for	multi-seat	districts	and	is	excluded	from	the	table,	but	it	is	insignificant,
given	the	low	disproportionality).		Moreover,	every	voter	contributes	to	their	party’s	seat	share.		The	votes	of	rural
Democrats	and	urban	Republicans	are	as	valuable	as	anyone	else’s,	and	racial	groups	don’t	need	to	be	packed	into
districts	to	have	an	equal	and	effective	voice	in	choosing	representatives.
Maryland’s	Democratic	gerrymander	is	an	excellent	case	for	understanding	the	dynamics	of	disproportionality.		Still,	it
is	highly	unlikely	that	a	majority	of	Supreme	Court	Justices	will	recognize	the	direct	connection	between	individual
political	equality	and	greater	proportionality,	indeed	greater	proportionality	than	our	current	electoral	system	can
provide.		But	the	Justices	have	before	them	two	clear	cases	of	extreme	partisan	gerrymandering,	each	designed	by
the	other	political	party.		And	they	have	a	discernable	and	manageable	standard,	symmetry,	which	provides	direction
to	how	the	problem	might	be	remedied.			We	hope	that	all	voters,	regardless	of	partisan	preference,	are	soon
relieved	of	the	very	real	discrimination	that	gerrymandering	causes.		And	we	hope	that	one	day	soon,	party	leaders
will	consider	the	electoral	remedies	available	to	them	to	advocate	for	greater	political	equality.
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